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Abstract— Nowadays, a large amount of user privacy-
sensitive data is outsourced to the cloud server in ciphertext, 
which is provided by the data owners and can be accessed by 
authorized data users. When accessing data, the user should be 
assigned with the access permission according to his identities or 
attributes. In addition, the search capabilities in encrypted out-
sourced data is expected to be enhanced, i.e., the search results 
can better present user’s intentions. To address the above issues, 
ESAS, an Efficient Semantic and Authorized Search scheme over 
encrypted outsourced data, is proposed. In ESAS, by integrating 
PRSCG (the privacy-preserving ranked search based on concep-
tual graph) and CP-ABE (ciphertext policy attribute-based en-
cryption), semantic search with file-level fine-grained access au-
thorization can be realized. In addition, search authorization can 
be done in an offline manner, which can improve search efficiency 
and reduce the response time. The security analysis indicate that 
the proposed ESAS meets security requirement. 
Keywords—Cloud computing; attribute-based encryption; 
searchable encryption; semantic search; conceptual graphs 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Today, cloud computing has become a mature computing 
model with a wide range of applications. And as an extension 
of the emerging concept of cloud computing, cloud storage has 
partially addressed the challenges of massive data storage. 
Enterprise and individual users purchase cloud services from 
cloud service providers and utilize cloud services for data 
management and storage. However, cloud service providers, 
which are not completely trusted by users, may suffer from 
internal or external attacks. People may be more concerned 
about data privacy issues, which will become a hindrance to 
the development of cloud computing. Since encryption is an 
effective way to protect data, ciphertext search technology has 
become a hot topic in the current research field. 
Recently, searchable encryption techniques have been used 
to solve the problem of the utilization of encrypted cloud data. 
The related investigation has developed from traditional key-
word-based search to smart semantic search. Traditional key-
word-based search schemes can hardly satisfy people's search 
requirements in nowadays since people tend to semantic search 
which can better understand user’s intention. The most ad-
vanced smart semantic search scheme over encrypted out-
sourced data PRSCG [1] employees Conceptual Graph (CG) [2] 
as its’ semantic carrier, which is a perfect and mature manifes-
tation of semantics , and realizes simplified quantitative calcu-
lation by linearization. 
In a distributed cloud environment, a large amount of pri-
vacy sensitive data is outsourced to the cloud in ciphertext, 
which is provided by the data contributors and can be accessed 
by authorized data users. When accessing data, the user should 
be assigned with the access permission according to his identi-
ties or attributes. This makes file-level fine-grained authoriza-
tion a problem. Existing solutions such as Sun’s [3] and Li’s [4] 
have some drawbacks. Sun’s scheme cannot achieve ranking 
search and needs a large computational overhead. In Li’s 
scheme, the search response time could be very long due to a 
low hit rate. That is to say, it takes a long time from the user 
issues a search query to obtain the desired results .This will 
significantly affect the user's search experience. And neither 
of them can implement semantic search.  
To solve the above problems, we propose our efficient se-
mantic authorized search schemes ESAS by integrating 
PRSCG [1] and CP-ABE [5] .The contributions of our work   
as follows: 
1) By integrating PRSCG [1] and CP-ABE [5], we 
propose  the ESAS scheme which uses Conceptual Graphs 
(CGs) as our semantic carrier to implement semantic search 
with file-level fine-grained access authorization. 
2) Search authorization is done in an offline manner. 
Search authentication is preprocessed before the user’s query, 
which improves search efficiency and reduces the response 
time. 
3) The security analysis indicate that our system meets 
security requirements. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
introduces the related work. In section III, the problem formu-
lation is given. In section IV, our scheme is described in detail. 
In section V, the security analysis is stated. In Section VI, the 
paper is concluded. 
II. RELATED WORK . 
Recently, searchable encryption has been used to solve the 
problem of the utilization of encrypted cloud data. The related 
investigation has developed from traditional keyword-based 
search to semantic search. Key management [6-8] is also 
important for the related security schemes. 
 In [6], Song et al. proposed the symmetric ciphertext 
scheme for the first time. In [10], Cao et al. presented a novel 
multi-keyword search framework MRSE supporting ranked 
search. The scheme was proposed under two different attack 
models in which the relevance scores were calculated in two 
methods by leveraging KNN-SE algorithm [11] . In  addition, 
the vectors are extended and virtual keywords are inserted to 
meet privacy requirements. Extended schemes [12], [13], [14] 
were proposed based on [10]. Fu et al. in [12] achieved per-
sonal search and semantic search with the help of online natu-
ral language processing tool WordNet. They constructed an 
interest model for each legal data user to store their personal 
intentions and extend the data user’s query semantically to 
obtain more related results. Fu et al. in [13] proposed a scheme 
that supported fuzzy search and ranked search simultaneously. 
In [14], Xia et al. constructed the indexes using binary bal-
anced trees, which improves the search efficiency and supports 
dynamic updates of documents. 
At present, research on authorized keyword search has 
been carried out a lot. Yang et al. in [15] employed a user list 
that is server-enforced to assist completing the search in the 
practical application scenario to achieve search authorization.  
The user lists contain all complementary keys of the legal us-
ers. But the scheme based on SKC only supports one data con-
tributor. Sun et al.[3]  put forward a ciphertext search scheme 
in a multi-contributor multi-requestor scenario. It achieves 
fine-grained search authorization which is owner-enforced 
with efficient user and attribute revocation by leveraging CP-
ABE [5] technique. The search results can be verified in terms 
of correctness, integrity and freshness. However, the scheme 
proposed in this paper only supports the exact search of multi-
keyword, cannot realize semantic search and ranked search. Li 
et al. [4] proposed a scheme that achieves file-level fine-
grained authorization and ranking search simultaneously which 
reduces computational overhead compared to [3]. In the dis-
tributed cloud environment, the attribute-based encryption 
(ABE) [16] is widely used in various networks because of its 
flexible access control and allowing users’ data sharing at fine-
grained level. Reference [17] defines the attribute’s revocation 
in CP-ABE with semi-trusted servers. Several papers (e.g., 
[18-22]) have studied related security and cloud issues. 
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. System Model 
The efficient semantic and authorized search scheme over 
encrypted cloud data ESAS is proposed by integrating the 
PRCSG [1] and CP-ABE [5]. The architecture of our scheme 
is shown in Fig. 1. There are six entities:  
 Data Owner (DO) provides documents to be out- 
sourced and assigns an access policy for each 
document.  
 Data User (DU) generates a trapdoor to issue data 
retrieval request to AMS and CSP. The data owner 
also specifies the number of results expected to be 
returned 
 Key Generation Center (KGC) is a trusted server. 
It takes a security parameter as input to generate all 
public and  secret keys in the system. 
 Cloud Service Provider (CSP) provides storage and 
computing services. CSP calculates top-k highest 
score results according to search requests and return 
them to data users.  
 Authority Management Server (AMS) is a trusted 
server. It is responsible for search authorization for 
legitimate users. 
 Natural Language Processing Server (NLPS) is a 
user-side server. It is responsible for semantic 
analysis of documents and secure index generation. 
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Authority Management Server(AMS)
 NLPS
Top-k results
Registration 
or query 
Key Generation Center(KGC)
Encrypted 
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 Fig.1. The architecture of the ESAS scheme 
B. Security Goals  
In our ESAS scheme, we make the assumption that CSP is 
honest-but-curious, i.e., it is curious about users’ privacy data 
and tries to deduce some useful information. Data users in our 
scheme may collude to access unauthorized documents. The 
security goals of our system are defined as follows. 
1) Confidentiality of indexes and documents. Our scheme 
should protect the confidentiality of doucuments and indexes. 
Since CSP is semi-trusted in the system, it is curious about the 
privacy information of users. CSP should not deduce any 
useful information from the secure indexes and ciphertexts of 
documents.  
2) Unlinkability of Query. Our scheme should ensure that 
the trapdoors genreraterd by queries are unlinkable. That’s to 
say, even if the data user issues two identical queries , they 
can be transformed into two completely different trapdoors. 
CSP cannot deduce the relationship between trapdoors. 
3) Collusion resistance. We should make sure that  
malicious users in the system can not combine their secret key 
components to get more privileges  they would not have 
otherwise. 
C. Notations 
In table I, we list the notations used in ESAS. 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS IN ESAS 
Acronym Descriptions 
iA  The i-th data owner. 
iB  The i-th data user. 
,i jD  The j-th document of iA   
PP Public Prameter 
iA
SK The secrect key of  data owner iA   
iB
SK The secrect key of  data owner iB  
GCs Conceptual Graphs 
T Access Tree 
CK The ciphertext component of k
Vc Vectors corresponding to the source document 
Td Trapdoor 
Ic the secure index 
D. Assumption 
We make two assumptions in our EASA scheme. They are 
as follows. 
Assumption 1: Cloud Service Providers are semi-trusted. 
That is, they will follow our proposed protocol in general, but 
try to find out as much secret information as possible. 
Assumption 2: KGC and AMS are trusted by all entities in 
the system. They will never leak information about data and 
related keys. 
In our scheme, we make an assumption that the CSP will 
never collude with the malicious users to help them obtain 
unauthorized access privileges. 
IV. ESAS 
The ESAS scheme is described in detail in this section. 
Six phases are included in ESAS: Initialization, User 
Registration, Secure Index Construction, Search 
Authorization, Trapdoor Generation, Query. 
A. Initialization 
KGC generates two multiplicative cyclic group 1G  and 2G  
according to security parameter of the system. Then, it 
produces a generator g  of 1G , a bilinear map e: 1 1 2G G G  , 
collusion-resistant hush functions * 1H:{0 1} G， , 1 1H :G  . 
KGC also chooses system’s secret parameters ,  pa b Z  ， ，  
randomly  . Let X be ( , )e g g  , the public parameters of the 
system is  
1 2{ , , , , , , , }
a bPP H G G g e g g X   
B. User Registration 
If data owner iA  applies to join the system, KGC generates 
secret key 1 2{ , , }iASK S M M  which includes one (n+1) -bit 
binary vector S and two (n+1) × (n+1) invertible matrices 
1 1
1 2,
n nM M R R   .When data user iB  applies registration 
for the first time, KGC generates 'iB s  secret key which is 
related to his attribute set 
iB
At . Firstly, KGC selects a random 
pu Z and computes ( )/uS g   , 1 uS g   then it chooses 
m pr Z  for each attribute im Bat At and calculates 
( ) ,mrum mS g H at   ' mrmS g The secret key of data 
user iB 1{ ,  ,  iBSK S S   : ( , ')}iB m mm At S S  . It is  sent to the 
corresponding user via a secure channel. 
C.  Security Index Construction  
If data owner iA  wants to outsource one of his document 
,i jD  to the cloud, he chooses a random number , 1i jk G  and 
encrypts 
,i jD to ,,[ ] i ji jD  using symmetric encryption 
technologies. The symmetric encryption key ,i j  is generated 
by 
1 ,H ( )i jK . Then, iA  assigns an access policy for ,i jD  . He 
selects two random numbers  
0, ps r Z and set 0r  as the root 
secret value to generate the access tree ,i jT  [23]. Hereafter, iA  
computes 0rC KX , 0 sC g , 01 rC g  ,  02 s rC g  and for 
each leaf node n in ,i jT , 
(0)nq
nC g , (0)' ( ( ( )) nqnC H att n . Let 
N be the leaf node set of  ,i jT . The ciphertext component of 
,i j is defined as   
, , 0 1 2{ ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   : ( , ')}i j i j n nCK T C C C C n N C C   .        (1)  
Finally, data owner iA  sends ,i jD  to NLPS for semantic 
analysis and index generation. NLPS processes the documents 
in a few steps as follows. 
Step1 NLPS chooses a processing method according to 
the characteristics of each document content as described in 
[1]. One of the methods is to calculate the scores of all the 
sentences and select the sentence with the highest score as the 
theme of the document. Then, NLPS simplifies the single 
theme sentence using Tregex [1] and expresses it in the form 
of a Conceptual Graph [2].  This method is for documents 
with clear topics. In another method, NLPS generates a 
conceptual graph for every sentence in the document. 
Through the above two methods, each document is 
transformed into one or a set of CGs. 
Step2 Conceptual Graph (CG) is an excellent knowledge 
representation tool with better semantic expressiveness than 
simple keywords. To predigest the matching process of CGs, 
we represents the CGs in a linear form [1]. Starting from the 
vertices with the most edges , a CG is divided into several 
entities, each of  which is a ternary group and can be 
represented as a dimension in the vector space model. For 
example, the sentence “Amy is going to London by train” can 
be expressed as triples: [ ,  ,  ]Go Dest London , [ , ,Go Agent   
]Amy   , and [ , , ]Go Inst train . 
Step3 NLPS constructs vectors 
,i jV   for each document 
,i jD  with the help of linear CGs. In the first method of Step1, 
,i jV is a binary vector. And in the second method, each 
dimension of ,i jV is the value of TF IDF . TF represents the 
frequency of an entity in the document, and IDF reflects the 
significance of the entity in the whole documents. 
Step4 NLPS  encrypts the vectors  acquired  by CGs to 
generate secure indexes. Specifically, 
,i jVc should be  
extended  to n+1 dimensions and recorded as *
, ( ,:)i jVc n . The 
n+1 dimension of *
, ( ,:)i jVc n  is 1. Then 
*
, ( ,:)i jVc n  is splitted  
into  two  random vectors 
, ,( ', '')i j i jVc Vc  follows the rules: 
if [ ]S t  ( [1, 1]t n   ) equals to 0, , '[ ]i jVc t  and , ''[ ]i jVc t will 
be the same as *
, [ ]i jVc t ; else , '[ ]i jVc t  and , ''[ ]i jVc t  will be set 
as random numbers which satisfies , ,'[ ] + ''[ ] i j i jVc t Vc t   
*
, [ ]i jVc t .The  secure index , 1 , 2 ,{ ', ''}
T T
i j i j i jIc M Vc M Vc . 
After the construction of secure indexes, iA  sends 
,, , , , ,
( ,  ,   ,  [ ] )
i ji j i j i j i j i j
E ID CK Ic D   to CSP and , ,( ,  i j i jID CK ) to 
AMS. 
D. Search Authorization 
AMS automatically performs search authentication for 
each legitimate user in the system. When a data user iB   joins 
the system and completes registration, AMS authenticates 
search rights for each document and generates a list 
iB
L  which 
stores the identities of documents he can access. Firstly, AMS 
tries to match each document’s access tree using 'iB s  secret 
key . If there exists an attribute of iB  matches leaf node n in 
the access tree, AMS computes  
(0) (0)
( , )( , , , )
( ', ')
( , ) =n n
m n
m n
u q q
n
e S CDec SK CK m n
e S C
e g g Y M


                      (1) 
Let Y be ( , )ue g g . Then, AMS combines all nM  to calculate 
the secret value 0( , )urrM e g g  of the access tree’s root node 
as described in [5]. If the following equation holds, AMS adds 
the ID of the corresponding document to the list of accessible 
documents  
iB
L . 
0 0
2 1
0 1
( , ) ( , )
( , ) ( , )
s r ru
r
s u
e C S M e g g Y
e g g e C S
 
 
                         (2) 
      When the data owner outsource a document to the cloud, 
AMS refreshes all data users’
iB
L  . 
E. Trapdoor Generation 
The process of trapdoor generation is similar to index 
construction. The data user obtains an n-dimensional vector Q  
by processing the query statement. The vector Q  is extended 
to (n+1) dimensions and changed into * ( , ')Q aQ r  (a and 'r  
are random numbers and 'r cannot be 0). Then  *Q  is divided 
into two vectors ( ', '')Q Q  which follows: if [ ]S t  ( [1, 1]t n   ) 
equals to 0, '[ ]Q t  and  will be set as random numbers and 
*'[ ] + ''[ ]  [ ]Q t Q t Q t  ; else '[ ]Q t   , ''[ ]Q t  will be the same as 
*[ ]Q t  . The trapdoor can be constructed as 11{ ',Td M Q
     
1
2 ''}M Q
 . 
F. Query 
If the data user issues a search request, he sends the 
trapdoor Td  to CSP and his signature ( , )
iB
Sig Q SK  to AMS. 
Upon receiving the user's search request, AMS 
authenticates user’s identity by his signature. Then, AMS 
sends 
iB
L to CSP. CSP calculates the relevance scores of each 
document in the list with the query by  
1 1
, 1 2 1 2{ ', ''} { ', ''}
( ) '
T T
i jIc Td M Vc M Vc M Q M Q
a Vc Q r
   
  
             (3) 
By sorting all relevance scores, CSP picks up k results 
with the highest scores and sends corresponding ,i jE to the 
data user. Upon receiving the set of ,i jE , the data user firstly 
recovers the value of rM for each ,i jE . Then, he acquires 
every document’s decryption key by computing  
0
0 0
,
1
( )/
( , ) /
( , ) /
i j
r
r ru
CK
e C S Mn
K X
e g g Y  


 .                                       (4) 
After recovering ,i jK  for each document, the data user 
calculates the corresponding symmetric key by calculating 
1 ,H ( )i jK . 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme from 
the three aspects: confidentiality of indexes and documents, 
unlinkability of query and collusion resistance. 
1) Confidentiality of indexes and documents. 
Our scheme should protect the confidentiality of doucu-
ments and indexes. Since CSP is semi-trusted in the system, it 
is curious about the privacy information of users. CSP should 
not deduce any useful information from the secure indexes 
and ciphertexts of documents. The confidentiality of indexes 
is based on the security of KNN-SE algorithm[11] and CP-
ABE. For PRSCG, its security is based on MRSE[10]. That’s 
to say, we can guarantee the privacy of indexes if KNN-SE 
can be proved to be secure. In this way, CSP cannot deduce 
any useful information from the secure indexes. Since the 
documents are encrypted by symmetric keys generated by a 
hash function, we base the confidentiality of documents on the 
security of symmetric encryption. The ciphertexts of docu-
ments can be decrypted only if the symmetric key is obtained. 
Because the symmetric key is protected by CP-ABE [5], only 
data users whose attributes satisfy the access policy assigned 
by the data owner can obtain the symmetric key and recover 
the documents. 
2) Unlinkability of  Query  
Our scheme should ensure that the trapdoors genreraterd 
by queries are unlinkable. That’s to say, even if the data user 
issues two identical queries, they can be transformed into two 
completely different trapdoors. CSP cannot deduce the rela-
tionship between trapdoors. In the process of generating 
trapdoors, the data user chooses two numbers randomly and 
transforms the original query vector to * ( , ')Q aQ r  . Then *Q  
is divided into two parts randomly according to data owner’s 
secret key 
iA
S  before encrypted by 1 2{ , }M M . So even if the 
data user issues two identical queries, they can be trans- 
formed into two completely different trapdoors. CSP cannot 
deduce the relationship between trapdoors.  
3) Collusion Resistance  
In our system, we should make sure that malicious users in 
the system can not combine their secret key components to get 
more privileges they would not have otherwise. 
In our scheme, the secret value of root node is covered by 
the component of ciphertext CK  instead of the private key. 
To decrypt a document successfully, attackers must recover 
0rY . To do this, the attacker must compute the bilinear map of 
nC  and mS . The aimed value 
0nqY （ ）can be obtained by this 
way. Because u is a random number chosen by a data user, 
the secret value 0rY  cannot be recovered unless the user has 
enough private key components to satisfy the access tree 
which is hidden in the ciphertext. Malicious can’t collude to 
access documents unauthorized because of the randomization 
of the user’s secret keys. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In our work, we propose our efficient semantic and author-
ization search scheme ESAS to better adapt to distributed 
cloud storage system which achieves faster response speed 
comparing to existing solutions as well as enhances search 
capabilities. The security and efficiency analysis indicate that 
our system meets security requirements and has a faster 
search response speed. Our proposed scheme greatly improves 
the users’ experience and is very promising and practical. In 
the future work, we will take dynamic updates   and multi-
contributor scenario into consideration. 
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